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Abstract 
Since the 90s of the 20th century, with the rapid rise of China, Sino-US relations have 
become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
trade protection against China has stepped up. Especially given the global financial crisis, the 
United States are waving the big stick of new trade protectionism once again, which has 
brought great negative impact on China's economic development. While purely trade and 
economic theory cannot explain the occurrence of the root causes of trade protection, the 
analysis must be combined with the use of the U.S. unique political system and use the theory 
of political economy. However, there still lack of the study about U.S. new trade 
protectionism of the current post-crisis era, and most of the existing literature is a return of 
theoretical review or about specific cases based on more macro analysis, especially lacking of 
system analysis on the motivation of behavior of the new trade protection. Therefore, it is of 
great significance to study the motives and decision-making mechanism of US trade 
protectionism both from theory and reality.  
This dissertation is composed of six chapters. The first chapter gives a brief account of the 
importance of Sino-US trade relationship, and showing the motives and significance, research 
methods, ideas, innovation and deficiencies of this study. The second chapter briefly 
summarizes the relevant literature and research review, including the theoretical basis of new 
trade protectionism and trade policy model of political economy. The third chapter analyzes 
performance of U.S. trade protection from a realistic point of view. In order to further explore 
the motivation behind the behavior characteristics, they have provided a realistic basis. The 
fourth chapter gives a systematic review of the decision-making process and influence 
mechanisms of the U.S. trade policy based on the political economy theory. Separately from 
three levels: the decision-making bodies, interest groups and the external system, this paper 
made the interpretation of the U.S. trade protection. As a complement to the fourth chapter, 
the fifth chapter analyzes the nature conservation act of the U.S. trade protection against 
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awareness. The sixth chapter predicts the trend of post-crisis era’s trade protection based on 
the previous conclusions, and then put forward our response from the perspective of 
government and business. 
Based on the above analysis, the main conclusions are as follows:  
Firstly, in the post-crisis era, the U.S. made trade protection acts against China in different 
forms. Such as China's "non-market economy status", "two against and two guarantees", 
International Labor Standards, impose "carbon tariff" on the grounds of environmental 
protection, the RMB exchange rate and other issues. They are showing the diversity of 
content and form, the broad scope, complexity of motive and the means of fraudulent and 
other characteristics, these also reflect future trends of the U.S. trade protection.  
Secondly, the U.S. trade policy-making process is the game's result between the U.S. 
government and various interest groups. This article find the reasons from the 
decision-making bodies, interest groups and external factors of the system, and think the 
important factors are: the U.S. government departments, the relevant interest groups’ lobbying 
activities, the rise of China making a challenge to the U.S. global strategy, the chance 
provided by WTO exceptional rules, the reality of U.S. economic recession made by the 
financial crisis and so on. 
Thirdly, based on the above analysis, this paper think that the post-crisis era U.S. trade 
protectionism will remain long, and China will be in a passive position continually for a long 
time. But a large-scale trade war between U.S. and China occur unlikely. On the contrary, the 
trend will be the cooperation of economic and trade relations between the two countries. In 
addition, in this new wave of trade protection, China can still take measures to cope with, 
although it is not a time to reverse the passive situation. For example, to make full use of 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, to establish a flexible mechanism for early warning 
against trade protectionism, to strengthen communication with other countries, to accelerate 
the transformation of economic growth, to optimize industrial structure and so on. 
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